NC Federal Court Certifies Statewide Class in Suit Challenging Fee to Pay Mortgage Loan by Phone
In a suit alleging that the defendant loan servicer violated North Carolina consumer protection statutes, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina recently certified a class of borrowers with residential mortgage loans securing property in North Carolina who paid fees to make monthly payments by telephone.
According to the complaint, the loan servicer charges a borrower $9.50 to make a monthly payment using interactive voice response system and $11.50 to make a monthly payment by speaking to a customer service representative. Because this telephone transaction costs the defendant less than fifty cents, the complaint alleges, the resulting markup is unconscionable in violation of the North Carolina Debt Collection Act. Likewise, the complaint alleges that this markup is unfair and deceptive in violation of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
In granting class certification, the court determined that the putative class was sufficiently numerous because the named plaintiff provided evidence showing that thousands of borrowers may have been affected — a fact that the loan servicer did not dispute — and that it would be impractical to otherwise join these borrowers. Relatedly, the court determined that class-wide adjudication will be superior to individual adjudication because of the large number of putative class members and the consistency, flexibility, and control that a single forum would provide.
Additionally, the court determined that the named plaintiff’s claims were typical of putative class members’ claims because they all allegedly suffered the same harm caused by the same conduct — a fee to make a monthly payment to the same loan servicer by telephone. Relatedly, the court determined that common factual and legal issues related to these transactions (e.g., whether the state statutes apply to these transactions) would predominate over individual issues.
The court’s order did not address the merits of the case, which remains pending before the Middle District of North Carolina.
